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Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a serious condition with a lifetime prevalence exceed-
ing 16% worldwide. MDD is a heterogeneous disorder that involves multiple behavioral
symptoms on the one hand and multiple neuronal circuits on the other hand. In this review,
we integrate the literature on cognitive and physiological biomarkers of MDD with the
insights derived from mathematical models of brain networks, especially models that can
be used for fMRI datasets. We refer to the recent NIH research domain criteria initiative, in
which a concept of “constructs” as functional units of mental disorders is introduced. Con-
structs are biomarkers present at multiple levels of brain functioning – cognition, genetics,
brain anatomy, and neurophysiology. In this review, we propose a new approach which
we called circuit to construct mapping (CCM), which aims to characterize causal relations
between the underlying network dynamics (as the cause) and the constructs referring to
the clinical symptoms of MDD (as the effect). CCM involves extracting diagnostic cate-
gories from behavioral data, linking circuits that are causal to these categories with use
of clinical neuroimaging data, and modeling the dynamics of the emerging circuits with
attractor dynamics in order to provide new, neuroimaging-related biomarkers for MDD.The
CCM approach optimizes the clinical diagnosis and patient stratification. It also addresses
the recent demand for linking circuits to behavior, and provides a new insight into clinical
treatment by investigating the dynamics of neuronal circuits underneath cognitive dimen-
sions of MDD. CCM can serve as a new regime toward personalized medicine, assisting
the diagnosis and treatment of MDD.
Keywords: major depressive disorder, modeling, circuit, diagnosis, research domain criteria project, dynamical
systems
INTRODUCTION
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER
Major depressive disorder (MDD), also known as unipolar depres-
sion, has a lifetime prevalence that exceeds 16% in the US (1), and
is expected to increase their share in the global disease burden from
4.3% in 2004 to 6.2% by 2030 (2). Treating MDD is costly. In 2010,
the total cost of MDD in the EU was estimated to be C798 billion,
of which 60% was direct costs and 40% due to lost productivity
(3). Currently, there is a rich variety of competing biomarker sets,
each suggesting different MDD etiology. However, it is unclear how
these relate to the current diagnostic criteria. This heterogeneity
of biomarkers, behavioral symptoms, and circuit changes in MDD
requires the use of multimodal and multidisciplinary approaches
together with mathematical modeling in order to integrate these
findings into diagnostic and intervention tools useful in clinical
practice.
So far, the search for candidate genes underlying MDD has
not yielded a single responsible gene. Instead, genetic models
of MDD propose that a large number of genes is involved (4),
with a small contribution of each of them to MDD phenotype.
Furthermore, these models suggest that epigenetic regulation may
underlie critical gene-environment effects in MDD (5). Epidemi-
ological studies have revealed that genetic factors may account
for 40–50% of the risk of developing the disorder (6). Since the
definition of an endophenotype involves heritability (7) and can
only be used in a family sensitive design (8), it leads to a con-
clusion that only particular diagnostic categories in MDD can be
interpreted as endophenotypes. Therefore, instead of talking about
endophenotypes in MDD, we refer to NIH research domain cri-
teria (RDoC) project approach (9) and to its central concept of
a construct as a basic dimension of brain functioning (without
a requirement of heritability). While defining constructs, RDoC
initiative refers to various units of analysis, from genes to neural
circuits and behavior.
In section “Etiology of MDD”, we review the current state
of knowledge about MDD etiology across multiple construct
domains, from behavioral through physiological down to neu-
ronal level. Furthermore, we propose a new paradigm to aid in the
diagnosis of MDD and its clinical management which includes
dynamical models of the underlying circuitry and mapping the
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activity of these circuits onto cognitive constructs diagnostic for
MDD. This circuit to construct mapping (CCM) approach can
facilitate a personalized approach to MDD and thereby improve
the quality of life for MDD patients.
CAUSALITY
Mapping the activity of underlying circuits onto cognitive con-
structs diagnostic for MDD involves assumption that we can point
to causal relations between these two domains. In this review, we
focus on the altered dynamics of neuronal circuits as the cause of
disrupted behavior. But how can one determine causality? There
are two definitions of causality, and both of which are often used
in research. First definition by Lewis (10) describes causality in
the language of counterfactuals: we may define a cause to be an
object followed by another, where, if the first object had not
been, the second never had existed. On the basis of this defi-
nition, in 1986, Holland formulated the “no causation without
manipulation” rule (11) which became the prevailing principle
in causal research for another two decades. Today, Woodward’s
view at causality through structural equations comes popular (12).
Assuming that we have an endogenous variable Y, produced from
variables X 1, X 2, . . ., X n, Woodard’s approach involves expressing
certain basic counterfactuals in the following form: If it were the
case that X 1= x1, X 2= x2, . . ., Xn= xn, then it would be the case
that Y= f (x1, . . ., xn).
However, this is not the only view on causality. Judea Pearl
builds in the counterfactual approach and writes in his recent
essays (13):“the essential ingredient of causation is responsiveness,
namely, the capacity of some variables to respond to variations in
other variables, regardless of how those variations came about.”
This is an objection to the idea that the establishment of causa-
tion necessarily requires manipulation; rather, it is sufficient to
observe the system and its natural course. However, the inference
of causality on the basis of observational data is not easy, and Pearl
developed a comprehensive theory of how to establish causation
by means of probabilistic models.
This latter view of causality is beneficial to causal research in
psychiatry; because, we are not always equipped with tools to
manipulate all the candidate causes in our system. For instance,
if we are interested in the causal effect of the insular cortex on
emotional states in patients with MDD and we aim to apply
the counterfactual approach in order to test this hypothesis, we
should shut down the activity of the isolated insula and reg-
ister the observed change in regulation of emotional states in
our cohort. However, since the insula does not lay on the sur-
face of the cortex, it is very hard to non-invasively perturb its
activity alone; since, so far the remote control of deep brain
activity is not available in humans. Therefore, in clinical tri-
als the second definition of causality is typically applied: one
compares a population of subjects with and without overacti-
vation in the insular cortex, and tries to find systematic differ-
ences between these two groups in terms of emotional states.
If the effect size is large enough for the groups of a given
amount of patients, the causal effect is determined. In the fur-
ther sections, we will discuss causality in Pearl’s sense, meaning
“observation” and “statistical power” rather than “intervention”
and “counterfactuals.”
ETIOLOGY OF MDD
CONSTRUCTS IN MDD
Causality in case of MDD (and other cognitive disorders) is a
complex research problem because the disorder can be described
across various domains, from neurophysiology, through neuronal
networks, to behavior. Although a causal explanation in MDD can
search for relationships between any pair of constructs, from the
psychiatric point of view links in which behavioral constructs are
the effect are especially valuable.
Figure 1 presents the variety of constructs across multiple lev-
els of description in a process of a typical treatment in MDD,
with arrows denoting causal relations between them. Firstly, one
can distinguish five classes of drugs (Figure 1A) on the basis
of monoamine receptors that they target (Figure 1B). A patient
diagnosed with MDD is typically prescribed with one or, rarely,
with a combination of these drug types. Functional MRI studies
reveal that these drugs affect different, but overlapping circuits
(Figure 1C). For any given construct, the underlying neuronal
circuitry, modulated by interplay between the neural substrates
within, reaches a stable activity pattern – which is pictured with the
ball metaphor (Figure 1D). The network specific activation pat-
tern, as we believe, modulates the particular cognitive construct
(Figure 1E). The behavior of the patient is subject to repetitive
diagnoses which, possibly, can lead to prescription of new, more
accurate drugs which closes the circle. In our understanding, the
mechanism underlying MDD is a superposition of multiple cir-
cuits, each of them having a causal effect on one of the cognitive
constructs present in MDD. Therefore, in our considerations on
modeling MDD, we are interested in the causal effect between neu-
ronal circuits (as the cause, C) and behavioral constructs (as the
effect, D).
We briefly review the aforementioned levels of the description
in the following sections. Although the proposed CCM approach
includes only mapping from neuronal circuitries straight to the
cognitive domain, the physiology underlying MDD is also worth
mentioning; because, the most popular (but not necessarily the
most effective) treatments derive from the monoamine theory of
MDD and target neuromodulatory receptors in the brain rather
than particular circuits.
COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTS
Major depression was originally defined in terms of behavior;
therefore, cognitive constructs present in MDD seem to be the
right starting point to give full characteristics of this disorder. In
DSM-5, diagnostic criteria for MDD are as follows: if the subject
is diagnosed with MDD if at least five out of nine diagnostic traits
are present (Figure 1E), at least one of them being anhedonia or
low mood.
Current diagnostic practice for MDD is difficult. First, both
DSM-5 and ICD-10 diagnostic criteria allow for a broad range of
behavioral profiles, all diagnosed with the same clinical condition
(14, 15). Second, the diagnostic criteria are open to different inter-
pretations, change over time and are therefore less objective and
require review by trained clinicians. For example, independent
symptoms of dysthymia (present in DSM-4 as a self-standing dis-
order) were recently classified as chronic MDD in DSM-5, because
since DSM-4 was released there was not enough evidence that
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FIGURE 1 | Diagnosis, treatment, and brain dynamics in MDD. One can
distinguish five classes of drugs (A) on the basis of monoamine receptors
that they target (B). Functional MRI studies reveal that these drugs affect
different, but overlapping circuits (C). Here, two exemplary circuits are
presented on the basis of imaging studies on two constructs present in
MDD: low mood (or negative affect) and anhedonia (lack of positive affect).
The connectivity in the circuits is presented with arrows, solid lines for
glutamatergic, and dashed lines for GABAergic projections. Findings on
regions activated in negative affect in depressed patients are summarized in
the “negative affect” circuit, left half-circles. The subjects were triggered to
fall into low mood by presenting them with scenes of negative emotional
valence. Findings on regions up- and down-regulated in anhedonic MDD
patients during presentation of scenes with positive emotional valence are
summarized in the “anhedonia” circuit, right half-circles. Deep red color
depicts overactivation in a given region during the task in respect to healthy
controls, light red – hypoactivation, stripes – counteracting evidence in the
literature, background color – no data. Additionally, treatment effects of
fluoxetine in the nodes of this network are indicated with black arrows (up:
up-regulation in respect to non-medicated patients; down: down-regulation).
Influence of the drug was assessed on the basis of imaging studies that
were using experimental tasks focusing on emotion processing (as
aforementioned tasks involving presentation with scenes of emotional
valence). On the left hand side of each region, influence of fluoxetine
treatment in negative affect regime in MDD is indicated, on the right hand
side: the same for positive affect regime. On one hand, this figure
demonstrates that drugs act on constructs rather than particular brain
regions. On the other hand, it shows that circuits underlying constructs are
strongly overlapping but not identical. For any given construct, the
underlying circuitry, modulated by interplay between the neural substrates
within, flows toward a stable activity pattern – the attractor state (D). The
stability means the network will relax to the same stable pattern even after
small degree of external stimulation. This phenomenon is pictured with the
ball metaphor. Treatment with drugs is most likely to change the patient’s
state by reshaping the attractor landscape. This drift results in change in the
particular construct, whose circuit is targeted with treatment (E), but may
also affect other constructs via circuits overlapping with the targeted one.
Then, the behavioral consequences of the treatment are the basis to
prescribe a more appropriate drug for the given individual (A). VMPFC,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, including BA25 (subgenual cortex); BA9,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; BA32, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; BA33,
part of anterior cingulate cortex; INS, insula; NAC, nucleus accumbens; CN,
caudate nucleus; PT, putamen; THA, thalamus; AMY, amygdala.
dysthymia is significantly different from MDD (16). Third, some-
times new MDD types are distinguished on the basis of specific
events triggering the disorder, e.g., grief in the DSM-5 [and in the
incoming ICD-11 (14, 17, 18)] and premenstrual dysphoric dis-
order in DSM-5 (19). This change of diagnostic criteria over time
leads to differences in interpretation and is a strong argument for
developing an objective approach.
PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS
As mentioned before, there is a variety of competing biomarker
sets, each suggesting different MDD etiology. The catecholamine
hypothesis of Schildkraut (20), originated in the 60s, advocated
that norepinephrine (NE) plays a pivotal role in affective disor-
ders, with a lesser role for epinephrine (E), dopamine (DA), and
serotonin (5HT) levels. The hypothesis suggested a reduced level
of neurotransmission in E, NE, DA, and 5HT pathways as a possi-
ble cause of MDD. Today, it is known that not only DA, NE, and
5HT, but also acetylcholine (AC) has a strong impact on mood
(21). Nevertheless, the mechanism of the shift from a healthy brain
state into MDD and the role of each of these neuromodulators in
this process are not yet understood.
Monoamines and AC are not the only neuromodulatory chem-
icals involved in MDD. Neuroendocrine mechanisms such as the
corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) may also play a role (22).
In depression, this peptide is overproduced in the hypothala-
mus, which, acting along with arginine vasopressin (AVP), triggers
hypersecretion of adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) from
the pituitary. Overproduction of ACTH leads in turn to overpro-
duction of glucocorticoids (cortisol in humans, corticosterone in
rodents) from the adrenal cortex. This circuit is known as the
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hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, and – as a part of the
neuroendocrine system – it controls stress reactions, metabolism,
and immunity (23). HPA theory of depression corresponds to the
evidence that, due to epigenetic mechanisms, early life events can
cause HPA overactivation in adult life (24).
Furthermore, recent observations demonstrate that antidepres-
sant drugs targeting monoamines also modulate synaptic GABA
transmission. Additionally, post-mortem studies reveal a dra-
matic reduction in plasmic GABA concentration in MDD patients.
These findings have implicated GABAergic mechanisms in MDD
(25), and led to the postulate that the balance of excitation and
inhibition (E-I) in brain networks in MDD is disturbed (26).
Another theory of MDD results from the observation that anti-
depressants induce plasticity in the synaptic strengths, altering
patterns of connectivity in the brain (27). Consequently, it was
proposed that MDD may reflect a primary impairment in neu-
ronal information processing caused by a disrupted functional
or effective (directed) connectivity rather than by any form of
chemical imbalance.
NEURONAL CONSTRUCTS
The identification of neuronal circuits underlying MDD with use
of fMRI initially has led to the default mode network (DMN) the-
ory of MDD (28, 29). DMN is a circuit defined by slow, coherent
oscillatory activity in a wakeful resting state in humans with eyes
closed (30). It mostly involves structures engaged in self-referential
processes (parts of the medial prefrontal, posterior cingulate and
parietal cortices, and medial temporal lobe), as well as the centers
for memory (hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus) and limbic
structures (amygdala, nucleus accumbens, hypothalamus) (31).
Imaging studies reveal that resting-state activity in many of the
DMN nodes is altered in MDD (32). It was recently found that
activity in DMN correlates with mood (33), therefore this circuit
might be responsible for the affective aspect of the disorder. DMN
is just one of many resting-state networks (RSNs) identified so
far (34), and methods proposed for identification of MDD on the
basis of resting state fMRI respect not only DMN but also other
RSNs. For instance, a recently developed computational diagnos-
tic method utilizing Hurst exponent takes into account DMN,
right and left fronto-parietal, ventromedial prefrontal, and salience
networks (35).
Recent evidence suggests that not only RSNs, but also the
central-executive network (CEN) seems to be impaired in MDD
(36). This network involves a few subdivisions of prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC), anterior thalamus, and dorsal caudate nucleus. As
opposed to RSNs, CEN comes to play during processing that
requires cognitive control (37), and therefore is responsible for the
executive functions, e.g., response inhibition, reward processing,
planning, and working memory. Therefore, as opposed to RSNs,
CEN might be involved in such constructs as recurrent thoughts
of death and diminished attention. These two families of networks
are complimentary and tend to switch the activity between each
other.
Identification of common patterns of up- and down-regulation
in the nodes of RSNs and CEN could serve as a new, more
robust mean to identify network-related biomarkers of MDD
(38). In particular, construct-based approach would allow for
creating of individual dynamical profiles for patients,and therefore
personalized therapy.
TREATMENT
Coming back to causality, we believe that treatments in MDD
affect neuronal dynamics, and this dynamics in turn triggers the
behavioral change. Treatment choice depends on multiple fac-
tors, including the course of the disease, prior medical treatment,
etc (39). Evidence-based treatment guidelines suggest cognitive-
based therapy [CBT (40)] and pharmacology (41) as the first
treatment of choice (42). On the other hand, electroconvulsive
therapy [ECT (43)] is only recommended if the aforementioned
methods are ineffective for the given patient, whereas deep brain
stimulation [DBS (43)], as the most invasive method, is not yet
approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration
for treatment-resistant depression (43). Even though new treat-
ment methods such as repetitive transcranial magnetic resonance
[rTMS, a localized, superficial stimulation of the cortex with mag-
nets (44)] and neurofeedback therapy [a combination of cognitive
therapy with neurobiological approach: a real-time feedback of
local fMRI signals (45)] are being tested, they are not established
methods yet.
An example of drugs as a treatment procedure affecting
construct-related circuits, changing the brain dynamical state, and
thus influencing the diagnosis is presented in Figure 1A.
CIRCUIT FOR MDD
As mentioned in section “Constructs in MDD”, our viewpoint is
that the mechanism underlying MDD is a superposition of mul-
tiple circuits, each of them having a causal effect on one of the
cognitive constructs present in MDD. In fact, the number of these
cognitive constructs, and therefore also the underlying circuits,
may be much higher than the number of diagnostic categories
specified in the DSM-5. Exemplary constructs not mentioned in
the DSM-5 but present in a vast majority of MDD patients include
negative bias in attention and memory (46), a negative view of the
world and the future (41), learned helplessness (47), obsessions,
and pathological rumination (48).
However, in order to perform a causal inference linking circuits
to cognitive constructs, one needs to determine which circuits to
study in the first place. MDD is a heterogenous disorder, and, as
such, arises from anatomical and functional changes in a wide
range of brain regions. The circuits that were first proposed to be
responsible for MDD consisted of regions known to be involved
in mood. One of these mood generators is the corticomesolimbic
loop: one of a few parallel, basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops
that projects from the ventromedial PFC to the medial dorsal thal-
amus through the nuclei of the basal ganglia (49). The other mood
generator is the aforementioned hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
axis (HPA) whose dysfunction widely affects monoamine path-
ways and triggers mood fluctuations. Recently, the viewpoint at
MDD and other mental disabilities through the prism of large-
scale brain networks identified on the basis of fMRI studies (RSNs
and subcircuits of the CEN), and interactions between them, has
gained in popularity (50–56).
We take this large-scale perspective. However, as mentioned
above, in our view the search for mechanisms underlying MDD
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should include zooming into circuits underlying single diagnostic
constructs. Large-scale networks are complex and, as such, they
might be decomposed into simpler functional circuits. This is
definitely the case for the CEN. On one hand, various cognitive
constructs could be characterized as different states within the
same network. On the other hand, CEN is most probably divided
into functional subcircuits which activate while solving particular
tasks involving cognitive control, e.g., reward receipt, signal inhi-
bition, decision making, language processing. Another example is
the DMN which generates mood. It might be composed of a few
interacting subcircuits accounting for generation of basic emo-
tions (57, 58) which do not coexist (59, 60). However, it could also
be the case that basic emotions represent various attractors of one
large circuit, which is why it is so hard to find specific neuronal
underpinnings of basic emotions (61, 62).
In terms of models, so far RSNs are better characterized than
CEN (63, 64), probably because of stable temporal dynamics that
can be easily investigated with fMRI. Interestingly, Deco et al.
(65) propose a model of the resting-state oscillations as a mul-
tistable system driven by noise, which is consistent with recent
findings on the dynamics of the functional connectivity in RSNs
(66–68). It turns out that resting state activity is not uniform but
involves numerous modes that switch on and off. Some compu-
tational studies suggest that the identified modes of functional
connectivity correspond to various eigenmodes of the anatomical
connectivity (69), which is a strong argument toward a viewpoint
at DMN and other RSNs as a number of interconnected circuits.
On the contrary, psychometric studies reveal seven dimensions of
cognition during rest: discontinuity of mind, theory of mind, self,
planning, sleepiness, comfort, and somatic awareness (70). These
dimensions represent various cognitive modes between which sub-
jects switch during the rest. This is an argument on behalf of
switching between attractors of one big network during the resting
state.
How do the circuits generating single cognitive constructs con-
tribute to this large-scale picture? The construct-wise approach
that we take is motivated by circumstantial evidence that, in
general, drugs target cognitive constructs rather than the whole
disorders. Figure 1C presents an example of fluoxetine acting
differently in MDD patients with low mood (71–73) and anhe-
donia (74–76). Influence of fluoxetine treatment on activity in
brain areas in positive (77) and negative (78) affect’s regime differ
(79). On Figure 1C, one more phenomenon is demonstrated: cir-
cuits underlying constructs diagnostic for MDD are not identical.
From comparison of these two simplified circuits for low mood
and anhedonia, one can draw a conclusion that some regions are
involved in the low mood but not in anhedonia and vice versa. Fur-
thermore, there are regions such as the amygdala that are either
up- or down-regulated in MDD, depending on which cognitive
construct is present at the moment.
The circuits underlying constructs are overlapping and inter-
acting; however, it seems that – as demonstrated on the example of
fluoxetine – pharmacology targets specific constructs rather than
the whole disorder. Interestingly, the same drugs are used in men-
tal disorders sharing common cognitive constructs. For example,
sertraline is used in the treatment of MDD, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, panic disorder, anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), social phobia, and premenstrual dysphoric
disorder, all of them involving fear (80).
MODELING MDD
NEURAL MASS MODELS AND ATTRACTOR LANDSCAPES
So far, psychiatric disorders have not been properly conceptu-
alized in the language of computational neuroscience (81–83).
Early research in this field was centered on reinforcement learning
models which describe behavior as taking actions which maxi-
mize predicted rewards (84). Since DA is believed to be involved
in prediction (85, 86), mostly the disorders linked to DA such
as schizophrenia were modeled with use of the reinforcement
learning (87).
However, since both calculating the odds for possible rewards
and taking decisions on the basis of that calculation do not
directly correspond to the neuronal activity and physiology of
the brain, models based on reinforcement learning are a poor
choice when it comes to neuroimaging-based biomarkers for
mental disorders. In the last decade, comparing structural and
functional connectivity in brain networks in health, in disease,
in terms of graph theoretic measures, such as small-worldness
(88) or modularity, (89) became a popular research direction (90).
These measures have led to multiple interesting results upon the
global properties of brain networks in cognitive disorders (91–
93) including MDD (94, 95). However, these measures only take
undirected connectivity between brain regions into account. The
assumption of undirected connectivity yields a conclusion that
for every pair of brain regions A and B, once treatment pro-
cedure targets region A, it has the same impact on region B,
as if one would target region B with the same treatment and
measure the change in activity in region A – which is, in gen-
eral, an unrealistic assumption. Therefore, graph theoretic mea-
sures do not extensively incorporate the information that can be
rendered from the neuroimaging data and that is of primary
importance for assisting diagnosis and treatment in cognitive
disorders.
Recently, the concept of attractor networks was proposed, as a
tool that might explain cognitive disabilities while corresponding
to the neural dynamics in the brain. An attractor network is a net-
work of nodes, often recurrently connected, whose dynamics settle
to a pattern stable in time: the so-called attractor state. Analysis of
the distribution of attractor states and their basins of attraction, a
so-called attractor landscape, was effected on a microscale so far.
At the microscale, single neurons are the nodes in the network, and
stable firing patterns of those neurons constitute an attractor state
(96). This approach is present in contemporary computational
neuroscience, e.g., in the models of activity in olfactory (97) and
auditory (98) cortices in rodents as well as hippocampal grid cells
in humans (99). This concept has also been broadly used in psychi-
atry. In example, the PFC has been modeled as attractor network
in order to explain the deficit in short term memory in schizo-
phrenia (100) and compulsions in obsessive-compulsive disorder
(101). Up until now, it is unclear how these models translate to
patients because neither the invasive measurements of a single-
neuron activity necessary to validate the attractor network models
are possible, nor do non-invasive methods have the appropriate
resolution.
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How about the macroscale? It is now believed that the fMRI
research can provide the insight necessary to understand cogni-
tive constructs (102, 103). But is the concept of attractors also
applicable for this sort of data? Here, we propose a conceptual
advance to apply mathematical modeling directly to patients. This
proposal involves looking at the large-scale neural circuits in order
to perform attractor landscape analysis on the macroscale. Mind
that brain circuits are networks of interacting nodes, and there-
fore can be represented and analyzed as dynamical systems, in
a similar fashion as networks of single neurons. As opposed to
microscale, at the macroscale whole brain areas account for the
nodes in the network, and attractor states are stable activity pat-
terns across all nodes within the network. For example, in case of
the fMRI data, the overall activity in a region of interest can be
expressed as the summation over activity of all voxels within that
region. This data is very convenient for neural mass models when
it comes to modeling cognitive architectures (104). The principal
idea of neural mass models is setting the density of neurons to the
continuum limit in modeling the activity of large neural popu-
lations. This assumption of spatially continuous neural networks
thus allows for analytical treatment of such global variables as fir-
ing rate in space and time. An example is the classic Wilson–Cowan
mean-field model (105). In this model, the activity of neuronal
populations (or brain regions) is represented by dynamical vari-
ables. Figure 2 presents a simplified version of the model where
spatial patterns of spiking activity are replaced by one dynamical
variable. In the model, effectively connected neuronal populations,
representing brain regions, interact and are additionally tuned by
neuromodulators. Such dynamical systems have a number of sta-
ble attractors, and therefore a number of basins of attraction. The
possibility is that in MDD patients, the shape of the attractor
landscape for a particular cognitive construct is different than in
healthy controls. However, it can also be that they occupy a“wrong”
attractor state (106).
TREATMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
All of the available treatments affect the dynamics of large-scale
networks and therefore also the attractor landscapes (108–110).
Therefore, with use of the Wilson–Cowan model, one can then
investigate the landscape of basins of attraction in response to
the treatment procedures. Antidepressant drugs can reshape the
attractor landscape in multiple ways: they can lower the hills of the
landscape around the current state of the patient or make the cur-
rent attractor state shallower in order to facilitate escaping from
the local minimum (Figure 2C, upper). The drugs can poten-
tially also modify background neuronal noise, which in turn may
affect the probability of occupying different attractor states (111).
On the other hand, stimulation methods that regulate the neural
dynamics directly, such as rTMS, ECT, and DBS can influence the
state of the patient by providing a brief pulse to the brain network
in the patient and thus allowing the brain network to leave the
“wrong” attractor state immediately (Figure 2C, lower). Interest-
ingly, in the treatment-resistant depression, electrical stimulation
through ECT and DBS prove to be highly effective (112, 113),
which means that, under some circumstances, they perform better
than drugs, or even than the cognitive therapy which targets the
cognitive constructs directly. This provides some hint suggesting
that looking at clinical symptoms of MDD through the prism of
neuronal circuits, and targeting treatments at those circuits might
be more beneficial than any other treatment, including, paradox-
ically, even the behavioral treatment centered at specific cognitive
traits in MDD.
CIRCUIT TO CONSTRUCT MAPPING
WHAT IS CCM
Every patient has a different, individual attractor landscape.
This landscape reflects such personal traits as the size of the
brain regions involved in MDD, functional connectivity within
DMN and CEN, baseline concentrations of monoamines, and all
the other endogenous chemicals that influence the excitation-
inhibition balance in the brain. During rest, DMN and other
RSNs are active and the patient occupies stable attractors in
their attractor landscapes. On the contrary, during solving cog-
nitive tasks, subnetworks of CEN come to play (depending on the
nature of the task) and the brain state jumps to one of its (most
probably, also stable) attractors. We predict that a disturbance
of the attractor landscapes within the DMN should account for
the cognitive constructs involving affective components of MDD,
whereas disturbance of the attractor landscapes within cognition-
related RSNs (such as fronto-parietal network) and within the
CEN should be responsible for the cognitive constructs involving
executive functions.
But how do these attractors map onto cognition? Let us consider
a brain network consisting of interconnected nodes described by
their activities, either in resting state or in some cognitive process
(Figure 3). While looking for causal interactions between neu-
ronal circuitry and behavioral outcome, one should perform a
mapping from a multidimensional space spanned by patterns of
neuronal activity (namely, attractors of the neuronal networks)
onto a multidimensional space spanned by the cognitive con-
structs. This is what we called the CCM approach. The direction
of causal inference in CCM goes from circuitries toward behav-
ior because the CCM approach is designed for better treatment,
which should ultimately target the diagnostic cognitive constructs
in MDD. Therefore, it is essential for the constructs to be compact,
but the underlying circuits can be complex as is necessary.
The CCM approach involves performing this mapping with
use of joint imaging and psychometric methods on large clinical
datasets. Once we identify the circuits underlying single cognitive
dimensions of MDD, we can perturb this construct-related circuits
in a single patient with treatments, affecting the neuronal dynam-
ics, and tracking both the resulting position in cognitive con-
struct space and the dynamical properties in the construct-related
circuits.
EXECUTION OF CCM
Execution of CCM is a multistep process. The preliminary step
is to determine an extensive list of constructs involved in MDD.
Since the classic diagnostic tools are questionnaires and experi-
mental tasks, this analysis would run through a number of various
variables, grouping them into dimensions, with a subsequent san-
ity check if the outcome constructs have a consistent content. The
list of constructs determined in this protocol can be longer than
the list of the DSM-5 criteria, thus we call the constructs with
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FIGURE 2 | Wilson–Cowan model and a “ball” metaphor. The activity of a
single brain area within the network is a consequence of the synaptic inputs
from other areas, the modulatory tone generated by diffuse projections, and
the recurrent connectivity within the brain area itself. The activity reflects a
specific balance between excitation and inhibition within the area. For
simplicity, we describe the activity by one variable, E, for which the following
equation holds: τ dE
dt
= −E + f (αE + βI + γM). The first term on the right tells
us that in the absence of any drive (provided by the second term), the activity
decays to zero with time scale τ. The second term incorporates the
contribution of recurrent connectivity via E itself, input from other areas,
represented by I, and the level of neuromodulation, represented by M. Each
of these contributions are weighted by factors: α, β, and γ respectively. When
the second term is positive, it increases the level of activity. The function f is
a response function that translates the sum of activities into a driving term,
and is typically sigmoidal (106): f (x) = Ax2
x2+σ2 . In this form, A is the maximum
that f can reach for large x values, and σ is the value for which f is equal to
half its maximum value. In addition, it also specifies how steeply f increases
with x, a quantity that is also referred to as the gain factor. Note that this
expression only holds for positive x values, f is zero when x is negative. This
model has a range of parameters, which is important because each of them
can be linked to specific physiological processes and changes in circuit
structure. For instance, an increased β represents a stronger synaptic
projection, whereas an increased α represents stronger recurrent synapses.
An increased M reflects the effect of neuromodulators that increase the level
of depolarization in the cells, and hence the baseline firing rate; γ reflects the
sensitivity to neuromodulators of cells and circuits. The value of σ can be
interpreted as a change in gain. (A) In a given region, the sigmoidal
input-output (I-O) relationship has three regimes. For small input y << σ, it
increases rapidly. For large inputs, y >> σ, it saturates. For values in
between, it connects these regimes linearly. If the σ value, and thus
excitability of the region, grows (dashed line), the I-O function is steeper than
in the control case (solid line). If the region gets stronger recurrent
connectivity, input from other regions or neuromodulation, so that the α, β, γ
values grow respectively, I-O function shifts to the left (dotted line). (B) In an
example of two interconnected regions, E 1 and E 2, this dynamical system
has three fixed points that are candidates for attractor states. In this example,
two of them are stable (red). For a given attractor, setting activities E 1, E 2 to
arbitrary initial values within the basin of attraction will make the system
move on toward this attractor. The third fixed point is unstable (yellow), which
means that every small perturbation from this state makes the system fall
into one of the basins of attraction, and thus end up in one of two attractor
states. (C) One may picture attractor states with the ball metaphor. Disease
can be represented in two ways. It can mean a change in the landscape of
basins of attraction: some attractor states change position and even if the
patient occupies the original attractor throughout the process, their brain
state gradually changes the attractor state that they occupy. This can be
achieved by changing shape of I-O function with use of parameters σ and α, β,
γ or changing of relaxation time constants τ. However, it can also mean that,
in a result of intrinsic noise in the brain or in response to a particular external
input, the brain state in the patient is triggered to switch to another “wrong”
basin of attraction. The noisy behavior of the network is not captured by the
basic version of Wilson–Cowan equations, but incorporating noise in and
therefore also a stochastic driving force is also possible. An attractor is a
network state where the levels of activity do not change anymore, hence E is
constant. Mathematically, this means that E does not change over time,
hence that its value is given by setting the right hand side of equation (1) to
zero, which yields E = f (αE + βI + γM), hence f gives the steady state
values, hence increases in the factors α, β, and γ immediately increase the E
value. It is important to realize that this is an equation from which E needs to
be found. In the preceding, we focused on a single variable E, but in a
network there is at least one variable for each brain area involved. For multiple
brain regions involved, which is true in MDD,
τi
dEi
dt
= −Ei + fi
(∑
j
Jij Ej + γi Mi + Istim,i
)
. Here i represents the index of the
brain area and j is the index of brain areas that provide input. Most
parameters now have an index i, because their value depends on the area
they represent. We have also included a stimulation current, which represents
the effects of electric or magnetic stimulation. Within this framework, the
effects of treatments can be captured. On one hand, treatments can reshape
the attractor landscape. For instance, pharmacological manipulations can
either change the level of neuromodulation or the sensitivity of the circuit to
neuromodulators. This would lead to the homeostatic regulation of the
coupling coefficients J ij , and σ, and, subsequently, to the change in the map
of attractors. On the other hand, a single electrical stimulation, such as ECT
session, could change the attractor, offering temporary relief; but if the new
attractor is not stable, the brain network could return to the old attractor over
time. A sequence of electrical stimulation would also affect J ij and thus
change which attractors are possible and how stable they are. Taken together,
electrical stimulation has the advantage that its effect is local and can be
tuned to alter/correct a specific J ij value.
anonymous ti in the Figure 3A. Furthermore, some constructs
may be heritable and thus fulfill the definition of endophenotypes,
which is especially relevant for executive functions (114), whereas
other constructs such as recurrent thoughts of death are not likely
to be heritable. However, this analysis will not reveal whether a
given construct is heritable or not.
The second step is to find neuronal mechanisms of each of the
obtained constructs. For every single construct, one should start
the procedure from the first order analysis: investigating patterns
of activation and effective connectivity in a cohort of patients
exhibiting that construct (and, of course, a cohort of controls), in
order to identify the underlying neuronal network and to build a
corresponding dynamical system (Figure 3A). Using Pearl’s defin-
ition of causality, for the effect size large enough we can determine
causal effects on the basis of this observational study.
If this first level analysis does not identify unique circuitry,
there can be multiple interacting circuitries involved in the con-
struct. In that case, one should perform a second order analysis.
For instance, one can perform repeated diagnostic evaluation and
repeated fMRI imaging assessment longitudinally within the same
patient. Then, using autoregressive models in order to analyze the
time course of the construct and correlating these independent
components with neuroimaging data should reveal independent
components in the circuitry underlying this construct.
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FIGURE 3 | Circuit to construct mapping. Causality between activity in
underlying network (nodes E1, E2, E3) and the multidimensional construct
space (t1, t2) can go two ways, but we are only interested in neural
circuitry as the cause and cognitive constructs as the effect [(A), green
lines]. Behavioral learning and neuroplasticity can give the backward
direction of causality [(A), red lines]; however, we do not cover this issue
in this paper. We refer to cognitive constructs as ti because the preliminary
step of the CCM includes determining the full list of the involved
constructs which can be broader than the list of the DSM-5 diagnostic
criteria. Prime denotes endophenotype, dot denotes a patient, asterisk
denotes attractor state. Firstly, circuitries involved in these constructs
should be linked on the basis of extensive observational research on a
large cohort of patients (A). Secondly, we can plot how these attractors
map onto cognitive constructs with temperature maps (B). In this
example, we plot the value of one continuous construct (which can
represent, i.e., level of mood) in a three-dimensional space spanned by the
attractors of the underlying three-node network. Thirdly, one can track the
current state of one patient both in the multidimensional construct space
during the treatment [(C), a scatter plot in case we want to track multiple
patients at a time]. Distribution of patients in this space may reveal
subtypes of MDD (MDD1, MDD2). Moreover, when the network
manipulation with treatment is sufficient, it can trigger the patient’s brain
state toward a new attractor in some of the construct-related dimensions,
and in a result the patient flows to another point in the construct space.
Since we will create these maps on the data from the limited number of
patients in the cohort, this temperature maps will not span the whole
volume of possibilities. Lastly, one may investigate how the treatments TRi
affect the attractors of the underlying networks (D). In this case, we have
three nodes in the underlying networks, which means that the attractors
of this system will be points in a three-dimensional attractor space.
We predict that positive correlations between revealed cognitive
constructs across patients are inevitable, which should be reflected
in overlaps between circuits underlying the constructs. We can also
analyze how the attractors of the dynamical systems map onto cog-
nitive constructs using temperature maps (Figure 3B). Since we
will create these maps on the data from the limited number of
patients in the cohort, this temperature maps will not span the
whole volume of possibilities.
The third step is building the dynamical models representing
the identified circuitries underlying cognitive constructs. The pro-
posed Wilson–Cowan model can be applied to any clinical data
that reveals the distribution of activity in the brain over time
(115), in particular to blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
signal in fMRI (116) or EMG/EEG data (117). Wilson–Cowan
model has some similarities to the dynamical causal modeling
(DCM), a well established method for extracting effective connec-
tivity for both fMRI and EEG/EMG data (118–124), in a sense that
it describes the neuronal communication between brain regions
in terms of ordinary differential equations. The major difference
is that – in both classical (119) and recent stochastic version
of DCM for fMRI data (125) – there is an assumption of lin-
ear transfer functions, whereas it is known that large neuronal
populations exhibit sigmoidal rather than linear response to the
external inputs (106), which is incorporated in the Wilson–Cowan
equations (126).
In this procedure, a single patient in a cohort is just an object
to the explanatory science. However, once the circuitries under-
lying cognitive constructs involved in MDD are determined, the
patient may become a subject in a case study, and receive a person-
alized treatment. Investigation of the trajectory of the particular
patient in the construct space in response to changes in the cir-
cuit activity caused by treatments (Figure 3C) might not only
provide new biomarkers for MDD and better insight into the
mechanisms of treatments, but also answer the question of how
to predict resilience to treatment. This research may also elucidate
factors that determine whether a treatment is effective to a par-
ticular group of patients. Furthermore, this analysis might help to
address the question if the mental disorders of interest, e.g., MDD,
are homogenous or split into subtypes on the basis of the patient
trajectories in the construct space. Lastly, one may investigate how
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the treatments TRi in the given patient affect the attractors of the
underlying networks (Figure 3D).
BENEFITS OF CCM
Circuit to construct mapping brings three new qualities to the
table. Firstly, treating networks as dynamical systems allows one
to extract and to characterize global properties of the networks
involved in cognitive constructs in a comprehensive and versatile
way. So far, research in human imaging was focused on finding
particular areas involved in cognitive tasks by virtue of stable acti-
vation patterns, or investigating context-dependent strength of
connectivity between particular areas. These are two out of many
viewpoints which one can take in order to characterize large-scale
brain networks. In fact, these are the two sides of the same coin:
the distribution of activation patterns in a network is a global
property emerging from behavior of the underlying dynamical
system specified through the connection strengths between areas.
Whether the activity patterns are more informative than the con-
nectivity strengths, depends on the circumstances. In Figure 4A,
we present a toy example. Let us assume that, in the simplest
case, our sigmoidal transfer function can be approximated as a
linear function. For some combinations of inputs to the network
and connection weights, a small change in connection weights (by
10%) yields an enormous change in the value of stable activa-
tion patterns (by 1000%, upper panel). For other combinations of
weights and inputs, even huge change in the connectivity strengths
(by 300%) yields a small change in stable activation patterns (by
10%). As a consequence, whether activity patterns in the networks
are sensitive to changes in connectivity strengths depends on the
tuning in the network, for instance on the balance between con-
nectivity weights in the network and external conditions such as
experimental inputs. Therefore, since the dynamical systems incor-
porate both connectivity (as the cause) and about stable activity
patterns (as the effect), they integrate the two sorts of information
about the circuits into one framework.
Secondly, the decomposition of psychiatric disorders into a
number of diagnostic traits allows for fundamental explanatory
research in psychiatry, and therefore also for new, neuroimaging-
based biomarkers for cognitive disorders. In terms of causal mod-
eling, gathering clusters of traits into big cognitive paradigms such
FIGURE 4 | Benefits of CCM. (A) Stable connectivity patterns and
connectivity strengths are two sides of the same coin. Let us assume that
our sigmoidal transfer function can be approximated as a simple linear
function. We provide an example of a network sensitive to changes in
connectivity strengths (a small change in connection weights yields an huge
change in the value of stable activation patterns) and an example of a
network insensitive to changes in connectivity strengths (a huge change in
the connectivity strengths yields a small change in stable activation
patterns). Therefore, the description of networks by means of dynamical
systems provides more versatile description than connectivity strengths in
the networks or stable connectivity patterns alone. (B) Decomposition of
psychiatric disorders into a number of diagnostic traits helps causal
inference in the diagnostic process. Networks Ni underlie cognitive
constructs Ci diagnostic to psychiatric disorders Di. Disorders D1 and D2
share a common cognitive construct C2, but involve also disorder-specific
diagnostic constructs C1 and C3. Let us assume that the joint posterior
distribution for every disorder Di factorizes into posterior probability
distributions for single diagnostic constructs. Let us further assume that we
find the same, specific pathologies in networks N1 and N2. If we can
decompose the D1-related network into a sum of networks N1 and N2
underlying single diagnostic constructs C1 and C2 (upper panel), we collect
more evidence for the disorder D1 (pathologies in both networks linked to
diagnostic constructs) than for the disorder D2 (pathology in one out of two
networks linked to diagnostic constructs). On the other hand, if we are not
able to decompose D1 and D2-related networks into networks underlying
single diagnostic categories (lower panel), the amount for evidence in favor
of both disorders is the same because both networks (N1 +N2) underlying
disorder D1 and (N2 +N3) underlying disorder D2 are pathological.
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as psychiatric disorders can be misleading, given that the disorders
strongly overlap in terms of diagnostic criteria. A simple example
is provided in Figure 4B. In this example, overlapping networks Ni
underlie cognitive constructs Ci, which are diagnostic to psychi-
atric disorders Di. Disorders D1 and D2 share a common cognitive
construct C2, but involve also disorder-specific diagnostic con-
structs C1 and C3. In this toy example, let us assume that the
prior probabilities of cognitive constructs Ci are equal and that
likelihood of the pathologies in networks Ni given constructs Ci
are the same. Let us further assume that in our patient, we find
the same, specific pathologies in networks N1 and N2. If we can
decompose the D1- related network into a sum of networks N1 and
N2 underlying single diagnostic constructs C1 and C2 (Figure 4B,
upper panel), we can perform statistical inference, linking specific
changes in N1 and N2 with constructs C1 and C2, respectively, and
collecting evidence behind the hypothesis that the patient is a sub-
ject to the disorder D1. Since C2 is also a construct diagnostic to the
disorder D2, we also collect some evidence behind the hypothesis
that the patient suffers from the disorder D2. However, assuming
that the joint posterior distribution for every disorder Di factor-
izes into posterior probability distributions for single diagnostic
constructs, we collect more evidence for the disorder D1 than for
the disorder D2.
On the other hand, if we are not able to decompose D1 and D2-
related networks into networks underlying single diagnostic cate-
gories (Figure 4B, lower panel), the amount for evidence in favor
of both disorders is the same because both networks (N1+N2)
underlying disorder D1 and (N2+N3) underlying disorder D2
are pathological, and we are not able to extract any disorder-
specific subnetworks which would provide any further evidence
in favor of one of the disorders. Therefore, decomposing mental
disorders into single diagnostic constructs and linking construct-
specific circuits is of primary importance for explanatory models
in psychiatry.
Thirdly, CCM as a modeling procedure that projects neuronal
dynamics straight into behavioral dimensions of MDD, could not
only serve as explanatory model when applied to a large cohort
of patients, but also enhance the current treatment selection for
individual patients and make a step toward the personalized med-
icine. In order to perform explanatory research “in Pearl’s sense,”
we need to use neuroimaging along with behavioral data from a
large cohort of patients because, in order to reveal the circuitries
underlying MDD-related cognitive constructs, we need to find
systematic differences in circuit dynamics that result in system-
atic differences in behavior. But once this explanatory research is
done and the circuitries underlying cognitive dimensions of MDD
are defined, zooming into the circuit dynamics and its develop-
ment under treatment in a particular patient would allow for the
personalized interventions.
LIMITATIONS OF CCM APPROACH
PLASTICITY AND NEURODEGENERATION
So far, sensory systems are best characterized in terms of under-
lying circuitries. However, events in sensory systems happen on a
millisecond to second timescale whereas the evolution of psychi-
atric disorders is a few orders of magnitude slower and therefore
might be much more complex. MDD may result from traumatic
experience or emerge without a particular inducing event, but in
any case the process of falling into a depressive episode lasts for
weeks, as opposed to perceptual learning which takes only seconds.
Also, some treatment procedures are long lasting, i.e., MDD phar-
macotherapy is primarily monoamine based and typically requires
intake for 3–4 weeks prior to symptomatic improvement (with the
exception of ketamine). This time course is a major impediment to
modeling MDD because imbalance in mood may arise not only on
top of changes in neurotransmitter concentrations, but also result
from other processes such as structural plasticity and neurodegen-
eration (127). The mechanisms underlying these two processes are
not fully understood, and, in the case of structural plasticity, is dif-
ficult to investigate in a living human brain. Neural mass models
can only serve to compare between different stages of the dis-
order in an individual, and between different individuals at the
same stage, yet does not provide a framework that demonstrates
real-time evolution of MDD.
HETEROGENEITY
MDD is a heterogenous disorder. The diagnostic criteria are still
evolving, and the recently published DSM-5 diagnostic criteria
for MDD allow for a variety of diagnostic combinations of cog-
nitive constructs. Is there a plethora of different MDD types, or
rather one prevalent state of mind that manifests itself in various
ways depending on the patient? This remains an open question.
Furthermore, in the literature, there is often no clear distinction
between patients who experience a first depressive episode and
those who suffer from recurrent depression whereas, as neurode-
generation proceeds and the severity of symptoms elevates, the
course of the disease plays the crucial role in the treatment proce-
dure. This also provides a hindrance to the modeling procedures
since the information about the stage of the disease is often missing
from databases.
Furthermore, complexity of MDD might project also to
strongly overlapping construct-related circuits. In example, it was
found that the same brain area may host different circuits, which,
when activated, have opposing effects on anxiety (128). Further-
more, fMRI studies reveal anticorrelated networks to be activated
during cognitive tasks (129). This is circumstantial evidence that
multiple distinct circuits can underlie single cognitive constructs
(Figure 1C). Furthermore, the same constructs can arise from
different mechanisms. In Figure 5, we discuss impairment in
maintaining attention as an exemplary construct that may develop
in the PFC of the MDD patients from distinct processes.
APPLICATION OF TREATMENTS TO THE CCM
Some of the possible applications of CCM such as DBS and ECT
require invasive methods that cannot be used in humans on a daily
basis, and thus require rodent models. Rodent models of MDD
are a well explored discipline. However, whether rodent models
in mental disorders are fully translational remains unclear, which
presents another difficulty for modeling studies. Whereas anhedo-
nia, weight loss and gain, hypersomnia, or psychomotor retarda-
tion can be measured in a rodent, some other constructs such as
the presence of recurrent thoughts of death, have no equivalent in
rodents. On the other hand, modeling that requires invasive tech-
niques such as electrophysiology cannot be ethically introduced
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FIGURE 5 | Attention as an example of a construct with multiple neural
mechanisms underneath. Maintaining attention can be disrupted by at
least two distinct mechanisms: (1) Oversensitivity of the ventral attention
network. Imaging studies revealed two systems managing attention in
humans. On one hand, we have dorsal attention system, consisting of
frontal eye fields (FEF) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS), controlling voluntary
deployment of attention (top-down control). On the other hand, we have a
right-lateralized ventral attention network (VAN), responsible for orienting
attention toward sensory stimuli. It involves temporoparietal junction (TPJ),
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) in the parietal cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG). IFG, as a part of orbitofrontal cortex, receives a strong excitatory
input from medial dorsal thalamus (MDT). Since MDT is overactive in MDD,
this effect can make ventral attention network oversensitive to stimuli, and
as a result holding attention on salient stimuli becomes difficult to the
patient. (2) Diminished communication through coherence in the prefrontal
cortex. Serotonin produced in the raphe nucleus (RN) modulates gamma
oscillations in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), most probably by acting on
fast-spiking interneurons expressing serotonin 5-HT2 and 5-HT6 receptors.
Gamma oscillations play a key role in higher cognitive processes, including
attention and working memory. Since serotonergic input to the prefrontal
cortex is known to be diminished in MDD, the decrease in gamma power
may account for the effect of distractibility in MDD. Both of the above
mechanisms lead to a decrease in inhibition within the prefrontal cortex,
which might explain why the attention, managed in the PFC, both can be
disrupted in a result of hyperactivity of the medial dorsal thalamus and
hypoactivity of the raphe nucleus.
into living human brains except under certain prescribed neu-
rosurgical situations. However, the TMS-, pharmacotherapy- and
neurofeedback-related CCM approach constitutes an adjunct to
rodent models and, as a non-invasive method, it is applicable to
patients. Among the emerging treatment methods, neurofeedback
seems to be a promising therapeutic procedure for CCM. This
method is known to change connectivity in the functional net-
works (130, 131), but its mechanisms of action are not yet known.
Yet the concept of guided self-modulation in a patient in absence
of any third-party tools such as electric current or drugs is tempt-
ing. However, CCM can also be paired with all the other treatment
procedures.
What can be a hindrance in application of the pharmacotherapy-
related CCM is that it is difficult to target a given construct with a
particular drug because MDD drugs act on monoamine receptors,
which are ubiquitous in the brain and present in multiple circuits
at a time (Figure 1C). Furthermore, some brain regions are hubs
that are affected in many constructs thus, targeting these nodes
with any form of treatment will have broad consequences for the
global brain state. For example, the ventral medial PFC is a major
hub in the limbic system known to be involved in low mood (72),
anhedonia (75), feelings of worthlessness (132), and diminished
working memory (133) in MDD. However, the idea is to provide
the online readout for the dynamics of all the involved circuits at a
time. Due to this approach, the clinician may first apply a specific
treatment in order to target a desired cognitive construct, and then
observe how the other construct-related circuits evolve along with
the targeted one.
TEMPORAL DYNAMICS IN THE RESTING STATE
Circumstantial evidence suggests that in some aspects, MDD
might require deeper insight into activity of neural networks than
the afforded by global patterns of activity in the populations of
brain regions as obtained from fMRI studies. For example, the DBS
has different remission rates depending on the temporal charac-
teristic of the applied current. As it was recently demonstrated that
in the Parkinson’s disease, temporally irregular DBS is more effec-
tive than oscillatory stimulation (134). This effect suggests that in
addition to the modulatory effect on E-I balance, electrical stimu-
lation can change the communication between the targeted region
and its efferents by affecting communication through coherence
(135). This means that the fMRI data, as they are lacking the tem-
poral characteristics in the brain activity, might give an incomplete
information about mechanisms of MDD. However, CCM is still
a substantial progress for the therapy and treatment in mental
disorders, and gives a first insight into the circuits involved in
the disorder that opens possibilities for further, more in depth
research.
EFFECTIVE CONNECTIVITY IN EEG/EMG AND fMRI RESEARCH
So far, there are papers whose authors use Ising models in order to
provide a global description of network properties (as a number
of so-called patterns stored in the network (136). However, Ising
models are defined only for undirected networks and, in order to
use full potential of the CCM, this approach needs a step further
by making connectivity directional. In fMRI research, parcelation
of the brain into regions is quite successful (137; Oort, in prepa-
ration); however, determining connectivity strengths between the
nodes is harder because of the limited amount of the temporal
information in the fMRI data. So far, the only widely used infer-
ence procedure for effective connectivity on the basis of fMRI data
is the aforementioned DCM; however, it is only applicable for very
small networks 3–4 nodes, requires predefinition of a number of
parameters and of network nodes, and in addition to that, as an
inference procedure, encounters some critics in the field (138).
Since region definition in causality for fMRI is extremely impor-
tant (Bielczyk et al., in preparation), there is an urge for new,
more data driven methods for approaching effective connectivity
in these datasets.
In the field of EEG/EMG on the contrary, the problem of causal-
ity is orthogonal to the fMRI field: the DCM procedure is quite
successful in finding effective connectivity between the nodes of
the network, however the optimal method for defining the nodes
as sources of the potentials recorded on the scalp is still an open
problem. Three popular approaches are dipole modeling, dynamic
imaging of coherent sources and frequency-domain minimum
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current estimation (139). These methods successfully identify the
main sources of oscillations in the brain volume, however there
is a room for improvement in terms of the spatial resolution of
reconstructed sources.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As proposed by RDoC initiative, symptoms diagnostic for psy-
chiatric disorders should be interpreted as psychopathological
constructs, which need to be investigated, diagnosed, and treated
independently. The CCM approach addresses this demand, and
provides with a new outlook at clinical treatments in mental disor-
ders. Namely, the treatments not only regulate levels of neuromod-
ulatory substances but also change the dynamical state of the brain
by regulating excitation-inhibition balance across brain circuits,
which can be tracked with neuroimaging. This change in dynam-
ics may be achieved in two ways: by inducing the structural and
functional plasticity that changes the functional connectivity in the
circuit (through drugs), or by providing stimulation/inhibition to
discrete circuit node (s) and therefore changing the global balance
in the brain (through electrical stimulation).
In this work, we underscore the potential of computational
modeling in psychiatry as a tool to unravel mechanisms under-
lying the diagnostic symptoms, to cluster diagnostic cohorts and
to customize approach to clinical populations in psychiatry. In
addition to this, we anticipate that in the near future, new, per-
sonalized treatment methods based on non-invasive regulation of
specific neuronal populations’ activity with gene therapy may be
possible. This approach is still in its infancy and remains to be
clinically validated. However, gene therapy up-regulation of p11
protein in the rodent nucleus accumbens proved to cause a reversal
of an anhedonic phenotype (140).
Due to our assumptions, diagnostic symptoms of MDD are
caused by (mal)behavior of the underlying neuronal circuits.
Therefore, we suggest that clinical groups homogenous in the cir-
cuit dynamics should also be responsive to similar treatments.
Conducting the diagnosis in terms of circuit defects based on the
construct domain will then ensure the clinical groups are clustered,
and represent more homogenous groups. Furthermore, compar-
ison of depressed patients and healthy controls in the construct
space may assist in the investigation if MDD is a single disor-
der (and diagnostic category) or whether it should be split into
diagnostic subtypes. It may also reveal cognitive and neuronal
signatures of the phenomena of treatment-resistance. Tracking
patient’s position in the construct space in response to stimula-
tion/inhibition on one hand, and the evolution of relevant attrac-
tor landscapes on the other hand, may provide new insight into
the nature of treatments and help to create personalized medicine.
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